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Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1955], Art. 8
CASE
COMMENTS
EVIDENCE: REBUTTAL OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
Leonetti v. Boone, 74 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1954)
The alleged negligent operation of defendant's motor truck by
a third party resulted in a collision between the truck and plaintiff's
automobile. The trial court instructed the jury that the statutory
presumption' that the driver of the truck was driving with the owner's
consent shifted the burden of proof to the defendant owner. After
a jury verdict for plaintiff, defendant moved for a new trial on the
ground that the instruction was incorrect. The motion was granted,
and plaintiff appealed. HELD, the statutory presumption does not
shift the burden of proof but does place upon the defendant the
burden of going forward; when defendant offers testimony rebutting
plaintiff's prima facie case the presumption disappears. Order affirmed.
This is the first instance in which the Florida Supreme Court has
been required to interpret the statutory presumption of agency or
consent raised by the negligent operation of a vehicle by a person
2
other than the owner. The Court relied heavily on Johnson v. Mills,
in which it was held that when uncontradicted evidence shows that the
employee was driving without the owner's consent the presumption that
the driver is the agent or servant of the owner vanishes. Two earlier
automobile cases 3 substantiate the fact that proof or admission of
ownership of the car establishes a prima facie case for the plaintiff. Both
cases stated that the presumption is rebuttable, but neither specified
the amount of rebutting evidence required to make the presumption
disappear. Except for Leonetti v. Boone, all cases relating to the presumption of the owner's knowledge and consent were decided prior
to the enactment of the statute; but the principles set forth by those
cases are probably still valid, inasmuch as the statute appears to have
merely codified the existing case law. The statute states that the owner
may rebut the presumption by competent evidence within the limits
of the facts. In the instant case, since there was a substantial amount
of rebutting evidence introduced, the Court found it unnecessary to
decide if the introduction of any material evidence would be sufficient
to rebut the presumption. The Court did, however, indicate that the
defendant's burden consists only of going forward with the evidence
2FLA. STAT. §51.12 (1953).

So.2d 906 (Fla. 1948).
IHastings v. Taylor, 130 Fla. 249, 177 So. 621 (1937); Dowling v. Nicholson, 101
Fla. 672, 135 So. 288 (1931).
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and that when he has done this the presumption vanishes. From the
tenor of the Court's opinion it seems possible that the Court might
destroy the presumption upon the introduction of considerably less
than substantial evidence by the defendant owner.
Florida also has a statute 4 that raises a presumption that a railroad
company is guilty of negligence when it is shown that damage has
been caused through the operation of its trains. The Court, in construing the statute in Powell v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co.,5 took
the position that the purpose of the presumption is to make the railroad, which generally has a better knowledge of the facts, go forward
with the evidence. The jury can then decide whether the railroad
was negligent. The Court, with two justices dissenting, held that the
presumption disappears even when the defendant railroad presents
evidence that tends to make out a case against itself. The statute
has been the subject of extensive litigation. Several cases have held
that the statutory presumption merely casts upon the railroad company the burden of affirmatively showing that its agents exercised
ordinary and reasonable care and diligence.G
In one case" it was indicated that the presumption of negligence
disappears when the defendant railroad company adduces "any substantial evidence" showing that its agents were not negligent. The
phrase any material evidence has been used in the same context,8 the
Court in that case stating that it is improper to allow the presumption
to remain in the face of conflicting evidence as to negligence. The
seemingly extreme view of the Powell case may possibly be explained
by the broad terminology used in the earlier cases coupled with the
United States Supreme Court's decision 9 declaring unconstitutional
an identical Georgia statute.10 The statute was declared invalid because the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted the statutory presumption as evidence to be weighed by the jury despite countervailing
evidence. 1
§768.05 (1953).
5154 Fla. 227, 17 So.2d 891 (1944).
6E.g., Atlantic C.L. WR. v. Richardson, 117 Fla. 10, 157 So. 17 (1934); Seaboard
A.L. Ry. v. Watson, 103 Fla. 477, 137 So. 719 (1931); Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Crosby,
53 Fla. 400, 43 So. 318 (1907).
7Powell v. Jackson Grain Co., 134 Fla. 596, 184 So. 492 (1938).
sAtlantic C.L. R.R. v. Voss, 136 Fla. 32, 186 So. 199 (1939).
9Western & A. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
IoGA. Civ. CODE §2780 (1910).
"iWestern & A. R.R. v. Henderson, 167 Ga. 22, 144 S.E. 905 (1928).
4FLA. STAT.
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